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In The Limits of Transparency, Jacqueline Best (Professor at the School of Political
Studies, University of Ottawa) undertakes an ambitious, intriguing, occasionally
puzzling and ultimately unconvincing attempt to reframe the history of financial
governance under the Bretton Woods regime in a postmodernist fashion. This
classical issue in international political economy has been approached from different
theoretical perspectives. The early realist view focusing on US hegemonic leader-
ship (as in Fred Block’s classic The Origins of International Monetary Disorder, 1977) was
challenged later by the sociologically oriented constructivist interpretation based
on shared rules and norms – a stream of literature inaugurated by John G. Ruggie’s
seminal paper on ‘embedded liberalism’. In more recent years, however, a new
consensus view has emerged around a neo-institutional approach inspired by infor-
mation economics and emphasising the ability (until the mid-1960s) and subsequent
failure of Bretton Woods institutions to draw lessons from interwar failures, enhance
coordination, solve informational asymmetries and provide incentives for coopera-
tion (such as in Barry Eichengreen’s Globalizing Capital, 1996). In turn, Best aims to
investigate the implications of economic ideas for financial governance – namely,
how theoretical developments influenced the way in which Bretton Woods
institutions managed ambiguities that are endemic in international finance: technical
ambiguities created by incomplete information, contested ambiguities rooted in
disputes on ideas, objectives and instruments, and intersubjective ambiguities
stemming from different interpretations and understandings.
Best declares herself equally unpersuaded by any realist, constructivist or institu-
tionalist account, for all of them not only ‘seek to limit the scope of ambiguity’
(p. 21) but also consider the latter a source of instability and treat it as a problem to be
fixed. Moving from Stephen Krasner’s definition of regimes as ‘implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge’, she aims to develop ‘a theory of political-economic
ambiguity’ (p. 13) based on the role of economic ideas in shaping expectations and
rules of behaviour. On such ground, convergence, she argues, may prove not only
unnecessary but even dangerous. Since the ultimate purpose of governance ought to
be to accommodate diversity and manage conflicts, ‘openness to ambiguity’ can play
a ‘constructive role’ by giving international financial governance a sufficient degree
of ‘institutional flexibility, political negotiability, and discursive self-reflexivity’ to
adjust to changing economic conditions (pp. 27–32).
The book exhibits a crescendo of normative ambitions which the author attempts
to anchor to positive analysis and present in the form of policy lessons drawn from
history. The narrative moves circularly, starting from the challenge brought home
by Keynes to the pre-war blind faith in free markets, passing through the progressive315 book reviews
‘hollowing out’ of his theoretical legacy, and culminating with the return to a laissez
faire orthodoxy dressed in neoliberal clothes. In the immediate postwar period, Best
argues, the influence of Keynesian inspiration favourable to government interven-
tion and regulation allowed the newborn multilateral institutions to manage ambi-
guities with a degree of flexibility and negotiability that enhanced financial stability.
As was recognised by contemporary observers and soon became evident in the
flourishing of opposite criticisms (a sanction of unsound finance for some, a gold
standard in disguise for others), the Bretton Woods agreement was a compromise
plagued by contradiction and ambiguities. The blueprint ‘drew its language from at
least two competing economic discourses – the minimalist, neoclassical approach
and the interventionist, Keynesian strategy for financial governance’ (p. 25). The
two schools had clashed during the conferences on the role of capital movements –
inspired by rationality, thus equilibrating according to the former, driven by the
‘beauty contest’ principle thus ‘highly capricious’ or even ‘destructive’ in the view
of advocates of the latter (pp. 46–8). Other critical issues had been left open-ended,
such as in the case of the ‘fundamental disequilibrium’ bound to trigger changes
in par values (p. 56). After the war these ambiguities made, possibly intentionally,
the agreement ‘an ongoing process of interpretations and negotiations’ (p. 58).
Best identifies in the pre-convertibility period of Bretton Woods the heyday of
Keynesian-inspired flexibility and negotiability, when, through ‘trial and error’,
‘political-economic norms were being formed, revised, and replaced’ (p. 64). The
failed return to sterling convertibility in 1947 and the retaliatory chain of devalua-
tions of 1949 undermined the credibility of orthodox, market-based, ‘neoclassically
inspired policies’, ‘legalistically unambiguous and institutionally minimalist’ (p. 72),
and paved the way to more complex strategies to manage international finance,
epitomised by the Marshall Plan and the European Payments Union. Best regards
these two initiatives as ‘Keynesian’ not because of their economic content but for
their ‘strategies of managing ambiguity’ (p. 77), the use of public (versus private)
funds and sources of governance, and institutional structures that ‘left much to
chance, negotiation, and national tradition’ (p. 77). Those ‘institutionally thick’
agreements ‘worked to institutionalize a particular set of norms while facilitating
their ongoing negotiation’ (pp. 81–2). Likewise, a flexible interpretation of its
mandate allowed the IMF in its very early stages to maintain an open-minded
attitude towards unorthodox practices such as multiple exchange rates (p. 84).
Best considers the subsequent abandonment of such flexibility and negotiability
as the ultimate determinant of the collapse of the pegged-exchange rate regime.
Increasing narrowness and rigidity dominated the IMF approach to liquidity, adjust-
ment and capital mobility. By ‘hollowing out Keynesianism’, both the neoclassical
synthesis and the monetarist revolution, in spite of their apparent divergences, con-
jured to ignore ‘the existence of contested and intersubjective forms of economic
ambiguity’ (p. 93). The diffusion of ‘a particular hybrid of Keynesian neoclassical
synthesis and monetarist approaches to payments imbalances’ (p. 96) among US and
IMF policy makers, and their increasing inclination in favour of econometric and316 book reviews
statistical methods, produced increasing confidence in technical solutions and a
growing inability and unwillingness to manage political-economic ambiguities. In
support of this interpretation, Best mentions the application of conditionality
to adjustment financing, the ‘common tendency to downplay the destabilizing
potential of capital movements’ and the inclination in favour of ‘temporary and
limited strategies’ such as the introduction of drawing rights, Roosa-style interna-
tional liquidity schemes and the use of monetary sterilisation (p. 108). ‘The hollow-
ing out of the Keynesian-inspired norms’, Best contends, ‘fostered the collapse
of the Bretton Woods regime... When one set of technical solutions failed and
another could not be agreed upon, [international leaders] were lost’ (p. 116).
The new financial order that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, based on floating
exchange rates, privatisation of international credit, increasing financial liberalisation
and a new centrality of the IMF as international watchman and lender, is presented
in the book as a definite departure from the founding fathers’ legacy of an interna-
tional system based on exchange rate stability and regulated capital flows. The main
culprits of such final betrayal were neoliberal theories based on efficient markets and
rational expectations, which completed the subordination of politics to economics
and again put governments at the mercy of volatile speculative forces (pp. 127–30).
The IMF played a role of conscious and active accomplice initially by advocating
capital liberalisation against its mandate, as set out in Article VI (pp. 133–4), and,
more recently, by contributing to the discursive demolition of the Asian develop-
ment model in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis (pp. 138–40). In very much the same
vein, the recent emphasis on transparency as a means of preventing or limiting
financial crises is indicted as ‘an extension of the logic of neoliberalism and an inten-
sification of its interventionist tactics’ (p. 152). Recent changes of attitude by the
IMF itself, such as a critical reconsideration of the Washington consensus and condi-
tionality policy, a more flexible approach to liberalisation, an increasing attention to
the role of institutions and the move towards increased self-reflexivity in its norma-
tive mission of norm-building, are dismissed by Best as tactical departures from what
remains ‘a monolithic vision of financial governance’ (p. 164). The emergence of
a new, more stable regime would require ‘a more ambiguous form of financial
governance’, more leeway for government discretion, a curb of the ‘excesses of
financial speculation’, and ‘much looser guideposts’ to recover the flexibility and
negotiability characteristic of the early period of Bretton Woods institutions.
Altogether Best provides only a limited original contribution to the understand-
ing of how economic ideas and theories shaped international financial governance.
The author barely scratches the surface of mainstream economic theories, and some-
times seems to privilege rhetoric over analysis. For instance, the switch in favour of
floating exchange rates is explained as motivated by the ‘goal of eliminating the
role of government in determining exchange rates’, grounded in the belief that
‘markets are efficient and welfare maximizing’ (p. 130) – whereas, in fact, advocates
of floating aimed at fostering monetary independence while enhancing govern-
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prove critical from a governance perspective, such as moral hazard in relation to
IMF conditionality, are simply neglected. Likewise, when strongly arguing in favour
of capital controls, no mention is made of key issues that have been extensively
debated, such as their enforceability, effectiveness and distorting consequences.
Surprisingly, given the postmodernist motivation of the book, Best espouses a rather
cavalier attitude also when it comes to analysing in depth how economic ideas
entered the discourse of financial governance and its rhetoric. Readers are given
little insight into how theoretical developments were received, adapted and used in
dealing with specific cases of adjustment and financial crises. In the case of the IMF,
for instance, the systematic reliance on secondary sources (such as Horsefield and De
Vries’s accounts) and the absence of analysis based on official documents is obviously
a suboptimal choice. A quick glance at the series of IMF Staff Papers or the use of
archival records (such as Per Jacobsson Papers) could have provided valuable hints
and suggestions. At the same time, Best seems to miss out some interesting implica-
tions of her own analysis – for instance, the fact that the postwar success stories of
flexibility and adaptability (such as the EPU) were based on regional and transitional
arrangements, which suggests that ambiguities might be more effectively managed
when the scale, scope and time-horizon of governance institutions are limited. In
spite of its interesting premises, the book too often inclines to an ideological fervour
that does little good to the postmodernist cause.
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Youssef Cassis and Eric Bussière (eds.), London and Paris as International
Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005, xii + 367 pp; £60).
This book, edited by Youssef Cassis (Geneva) and Eric Bussière (Paris-Sorbonne), is
the product of an Anglo-French business history conference, which was held at the
London School of Economics in April 2001. After a brilliant introduction by Cassis,
it contains fifteen chapters by British and French (including one Canadian) experts
in banking and financial history. They are arranged in five parts. The first one has
two overall surveys of the history of London and Paris as international financial
centres from 1890 to 2000. The four other parts follow a chronological order.
Part II deals with ‘the Golden Age’, from 1890 to World War 1; part III is
concerned with ‘the Dark Ages’ (this reviewer’s expression) of disasters and regional
withdrawal, from 1914 to 1958; part IV analyses the revival which followed and ‘the
road to globalization’ (1958–1980). Finally, the last two decades of the twentieth
century are considered in part V, under the heading ‘Internationalization and
globalization’. Most chapters are based on printed sources and the literature, but
three of the French papers have used records of Paris banks and some private papers
(one of them, moreover, by Flandreau and Gallice, is methodologically innovative
in its use of microeconomics). They are not comparative studies, as each of them is